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Evidence-Based Policymaking in 
the Food–Health Nexus* 
Cecilia Rocha1 and Jody Harris2
Abstract This article examines the role of evidence in influencing food and 
nutrition-related public health policy, and starts to chart a way through the 
political economy of knowledge and evidence within this nexus. We propose 
an analytical framework for untangling the influence of food industry 
interests and public health concerns in the policy process, presenting a 
guiding structure for how an issue might move between contested and 
uncontested policy spaces, finding that the inherent uncertainty in public 
health research on complex food systems presents opportunities for 
contestation by different interest groups. We then use our framework to 
understand the political economy of the recent sugar-sweetened beverage 
tax in Mexico, in which public health policies have been adopted despite 
going against an apparent interest of elements in the food industry. This 
kind of evidence, given the right framing, has the potential to break some 
current deadlocks in creating healthier food systems.
Keywords: evidence-based policy, issue framing, food and nutrition 
policy, sugar-sweetened beverages, taxation, Mexico.
1 Introduction
Evidence-based policymaking, initially applied in medical policy but 
increasingly promoted in other social policy fields, is a movement that 
seeks to place scientific knowledge and its associated epistemological 
assumptions at the centre of  political decision-making (Biesta 2007). 
Proponents of  this approach are aiming for what they identify as the 
best outcomes, maximising public values such as reducing health 
impacts or enhancing wellbeing; but there are other approaches to 
policy processes that prioritise, for example, outcomes favoured by 
specific interest groups, or that prioritise a participatory process over any 
particular outcome (Stirling 2012; Clarence 2002). Whichever approach 
is prioritised, the framing of  an issue sits between the evidence that is 
produced and the political decisions that are taken; the way an issue is 
framed by different parties at different times is a powerful piece of  the 
policy process, and in a practical field such as nutrition or public health 
it will determine who gets involved, and how solutions are decided 
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(Shiffman 2007; Gillespie et al. 2013). Theories of  knowledge and the 
politics of  knowledge are therefore key to understanding why certain 
information is privileged over others in food, nutrition, and health policy.
To this end, this article examines the role of  evidence in influencing 
food system policy, and starts to chart a way through the political 
economy of  knowledge and evidence within this nexus. In Section 2 
of  this article, we propose an analytical framework for untangling the 
influence of  food industry interests and public health concerns in the 
policy process. In Section 3, we discuss the issues in establishing enough 
evidence for action (written policy creation) in an environment of  
conflicting interests and ideas. In Section 4, we look at an example in 
which public health policies have been adopted despite going against 
an apparent interest of, or even active opposition from, elements in the 
food industry. In the conclusion we summarise our findings in relation 
to power and the political economy of  knowledge and evidence in 
food system policy. This article is based on the report Unravelling the 
Food–Health Nexus (IPES-Food 2017) and reflections from a subsequent 
workshop held at the Institute of  Development Studies in 2018 to 
discuss the role of  political economy in food systems research.
2 A framework for assessing how evidence impacts policymaking
Generic models of  how policy is made and implemented generally 
start with issue framing (Lasswell 1971), proceeding through a cycle of  
agenda setting; policy formulation and legitimation; implementation; 
and evaluation and review. This fairly linear view of  evidence-into-
policy, where evidence informs agenda setting, has also been adopted 
in much health sciences reasoning, including within the evidence-based 
policy world (Fafard 2008). These stages are generally acknowledged 
to exist in any policy process, even if  the order of  the process is more 
iterative than linear; for instance, continued issue framing and agenda 
setting often accompanies (rather than precedes) each of  these stages, as 
learning is fed back and original policy aims are subverted or changed 
(Keeley and Scoones 1999). As issues are framed and agendas set and 
re-set, one piece of  the complex puzzle is the role of  evidence, and 
its use to inform policy. The role of  evidence varies at different stages 
in the policymaking cycle, with different coalitions of  policy actors 
(including researchers) creating different narratives around evidence to 
resonate with policymakers’ values and interests in different contexts, 
and to seek policy influence (Fafard 2008). Policy in the critical tradition 
is seen through the lens of  power, and in particular who has the power 
to define agendas through defining the language and knowledge used 
in policy systems (Brock, Cornwall and Gaventa 2001). The relative 
power of  different actors’ narratives on a given issue is therefore critical 
to how evidence is used, and where different issues sit between the 
different actors involved will determine aspects of  the debate. In other 
words, issue framing and agenda setting is a dynamic process, in which 
different groups and their chosen issues may change their political 
prominence over time, and it is this feature that opens opportunities for 
influencing policymaking.
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In attempting to discern the issues shaping this confrontation and 
its ultimate results in terms of  food and nutrition policy, we need to 
recognise that food systems are complex, and that this complexity makes 
for a difficult process in the development of  accepted evidence. This 
complexity increases the challenge in evaluating whatever evidence 
is available, and often delays the adoption and implementation of  
proposed actions to address health problems associated with food 
systems. One role of  research and evidence practitioners and advocates 
is therefore to frame an issue in such a way that it increases its 
legitimacy, moving it up the political agenda. Evidence and the way 
it is framed into narratives can help different groups and issues reach 
prominence in political circles (Mitchell, Agle and Wood 1997), and 
hence be more likely to get a policy response. Groups and issues can 
also fall off the policy agenda; for example, when a particular piece 
of  scientific evidence is less widely accepted or is successfully refuted, 
allowing public resources and public attention to be redirected to other 
goals. Policies can be created but also revoked as evidence emerges or is 
framed differently.
The 2017 report by IPES-Food argues for a systemic approach to 
look at the health impacts of  food systems. It shows that food systems 
affect health through multiple, interconnected pathways, generating 
severe human and economic costs. Many of  the most severe health 
impacts can be traced back to some of  the core industrial food and 
farming practices, for example chemical-intensive agriculture; intensive 
livestock production; the mass production and mass marketing of  
ultra-processed foods; and the development of  long and deregulated 
global commodity supply chains (IPES-Food 2017). Public policy in 
these areas, however, does not seem to be developing with the efficacy 
and urgency that public health practitioners and scientific experts in this 
field are demanding. The scenario is then set for confrontation between 
two main camps attempting to influence food and nutrition policy: 
food industry interests and public health concerns. We present below a 
framework for understanding these interactions in the policy space.
The Venn diagram in Figure 1 is used to represent different stages of  
public and political awareness through which a particular health issue 
might move, before policy on that issue is created. In evidence-based 
policy theory, the successful creation and framing of  evidence will help 
move an issue into public health concerns (from area 5, outside of  the 
framework, to areas 4 or 3) and then to public policy (areas 2 and 1).
In the diagram (Figure 1), public health concerns associated with 
evidence-based policymaking are represented in five areas:
 l Area 5: Represents issues that are not yet identified as public health 
concerns (and, thus, are not being considered for policy). Research 
and information (the accumulation and framing of  evidence) can 
move some of  those issues to within the circle of  public policy 
concerns.
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 l Area 4: Represents issues that are of  current public health concern, 
that do not seem to conflict with food industry interests, but are not 
yet addressed in policy. The pathway for these issues could be to 
move to area 2 with appropriate advocacy.
 l Area 3: Represents public health concerns that are not yet addressed 
in policy, and openly conflict with food industry interests. Success by 
public health policy or food industry advocates would move these 
issues to area 1.
 l Area 2: Represents issues that are addressed in policy, which do not 
have an apparent conflict with food industry interests.
 l Area 1: Represents public health concerns that are addressed in 
policy, which are in explicit conflict with food industry interests. 
These are either public health policies, which go against food 
industry interests; or policies favouring food industry interests, which 
go against public health concerns.
Other areas (6 and 7) indicated in the diagram represent food industry 
interests that are not in apparent conflict with public health concerns: 
food industry interests which are favourably supported in policy (area 6); 
and those that are not yet represented in policy (area 7). Success by food 
industry policy advocates would move issues from area 7 to area 6.
An example of  how a policy issue moves through this framework is 
illustrated through the public health concern with sugar: 50 years ago 
sugar was not a predominant public health issue (area 5). Over time, 
Figure 1 A proposed framework to represent different stages of public and political 
awareness
Source Authors’ own, created by Cecilia Rocha.
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as scientific evidence about health impacts associated with sugar 
consumption such as diabetes, obesity, and other metabolic change 
mounted, excess sugar consumption moved to be a public health 
concern (area 4). While one could entertain the possibility of  public 
policy being made without conflict with industry (area 2), the reality 
shows strong industry push-back on advocacy against excess sugar 
consumption as a health issue, both in contexts where there is no policy 
(area 3) and in a few cases where there is sugar policy (area 1). The case 
of  sugar in Mexican health policy is explored further in Section 4 as 
an example.
3 Establishing evidence as a basis for policymaking
When is evidence enough to influence policy? For many food-related 
health impacts, there are strong associations with food systems practices, 
but it remains difficult to isolate specific causal channels. This opens up 
space for confusion and the creation of  narratives questioning whether 
the evidence available is sufficient for creating or enacting policy.
Much of  the issue relates to the continuous evolution of  the views on 
establishing causality in epidemiology, the scientific discipline which 
underpins the majority of  public health research (De Vreese 2009; 
Parascandola 2011). While the goal of  epidemiology is to identify causes 
of  disease so that the disease or its consequences might be prevented 
(informing public health efforts), its definition of  ‘cause’ has undergone 
some significant transformation in the past 60 years (Broadbent 2009). 
In the classic definition, causation was deterministic, in the sense that 
the presence of  one agent led to a given disease (‘A causes B’). This 
single-cause view was (and continues to be) very suitable for the study of  
infectious diseases, in which the presence of  an agent is necessary and 
often sufficient to establish causation (e.g. tubercle bacillus is a necessary 
cause for tuberculosis).
However, the single-cause model does not work well for the analysis 
of  the complex and multi-causal health issues associated with food 
systems. Take, for example, the case of  chronic diseases (e.g. diabetes). 
Causation in chronic disease requires a multifactorial analysis of  one 
or more agents (causes), the host (individuals’ characteristics), and 
the environment. Diseases are attributable to various (sometimes 
overlapping) causal mechanisms. There is a web of  components acting 
together, no one of  which may be sufficient or necessary to cause a 
given disease (Krieger 1994; McGwin 2010). In modern epidemiology, 
those different component causes are risk factors affecting the 
probability of  the disease to occur in a population.
In many of  the channels through which food systems can impact 
health, there are clear associations between food systems activities and 
specific health impacts (IPES-Food 2017). In some cases, studies are still 
needed to strengthen the suspected risk. This is particularly true for the 
associations between diets and non-communicable diseases (NCDs). 
The incidence of  NCDs is highly contingent on a person’s genetics 
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and general health status. Causality at the individual level remains 
difficult to prove. Indeed, difficulties of  this type plague the evidence 
base on diet-related health impacts. They reflect the dual complexity 
of  nutritional/dietary pathways: difficulties in isolating the effects of  
different dietary components, and difficulties in isolating diets from a 
range of  other lifestyle-related and socioeconomic drivers of  NCDs.
However, the point of  a systemic, epidemiological analysis is that these 
factors need not be isolated. Channels of  impact grouped under the 
umbrella of  ‘unhealthy dietary patterns’, for example, are characterised 
by the complex and multifactorial nature of  all diet-related conditions, 
with obesity playing an important mediating role in the epidemiology 
of  many NCDs (Butland et al. 2007; Grundy 2016; Wang et al. 2011). 
The question of  whether and to what extent these causal pathways 
actually need to be singled out in order to provide a sufficient evidence 
base for policymaking is misleading and misplaced in the case of  
public health. The focus is prevention of  diseases at the population 
level, not at the individual level. Risk assessment at the population level 
(probabilistic account in terms of  average effects) does not translate to 
individual levels (De Vreese 2009). That is to say, even if  reduction in 
the consumption of  sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs), for example, can 
lead to a decrease in obesity rates at the population level, and a lower 
rate of  diabetes, many individuals in this population may still become 
obese, and many may develop diabetes, even without consuming SSBs.
The negative health impacts of  food systems are multifactorial and 
at the population level. They are caused by many agents, which 
often reinforce each other, through various mechanisms. It is thus 
inappropriate to look for a solitary, unique, and definite cause for these 
conditions. It is also wrong to extrapolate that the lack of  ‘proof ’ on 
a causal chain between exposure and disease onset at the individual 
level negates an established risk factor (cause) for the condition at the 
population level (Laubach 2016). Just because it may not be possible 
to establish that high sugar consumption caused the diabetes of  a 
particular individual, it does not mean that high sugar consumption is 
not a risk factor for diabetes. For disease prevention, we need to identify 
and determine the importance of  specific risk factors (not the cause) by 
the accumulation of  evidence from many different studies and study 
types (Hill 1965; Ioannidis 2016).
It is the collective strength, consistency, plausibility, and coherence of  
these studies that establishes a given agent as a major risk factor in a 
disease. What we have then is the probability of  an agent affecting 
the incidence of  a disease in a population – but not the certainty of  
a given agent in a given context. This uncertainty opens the door for 
contestation and interpretation of  evidence, with different groups, with 
different interests, framing evidence in different ways to influence how it 
might inform action.
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3.1 The role of the food industry in framing evidence
Given the importance not only of  the evidence itself, but also of  how 
the evidence is framed, it is unsurprising that both sides of  the debate 
wish to set the narrative. To this end, there is increasing evidence of  
the role of  some corporations in the agri-food industry in influencing 
debates around nutrition and health through funding their own research 
(Brownell and Warner 2009; Nestle 2015, 2016). Major discrepancies 
have been found, for example, between the results of  industry-funded 
and non-industry-funded studies on the health impacts of  sugar 
consumption and SSBs (Bes-Rastrollo et al. 2013; Vartanian, Schwartz 
and Brownell 2007). Explicit attempts from the 1960s onwards to 
divert attention from sugar onto fat as a heart disease risk factor were 
recently uncovered, and are seen to have significantly derailed decades 
of  medical research around sugar (Kearns, Schmidt and Glantz 2016; 
O’Connor 2016). Popkin and Hawkes (2016: 175) conclude that it is 
only studies funded by the sugar and beverage industries that continue 
to cast doubt on the evidence – shown through extensive meta-analyses 
– of  substantial weight gain and cardio-metabolic risks from SSBs.
Industry funding of  professional associations has also been alleged to 
heavily influence the framing of  prominent public health debates (Nestle 
2015; Simon 2013, 2015). For example, the scientific objectivity of  the 
American Society for Nutrition (ASN) and the Academy of  Nutrition 
and Dietetics (AND) has been called into question on the basis of  strong 
ties to the food and beverage industry (Simon 2013, 2015). This has 
major implications since the ASN is the publisher of  three widely read 
nutrition science journals, the American Journal of  Clinical Nutrition, the 
Journal of  Nutrition, and Advances in Nutrition, in which many industry-
funded studies are published. Meanwhile, the ‘Nutrition Fact Sheets’ 
produced and publicised by the American Dietetic Association (ADA) 
have been called into question on the grounds of  industry partners 
having paid for the right to co-write them (Brownell and Warner 2009).
Industry influence over the framing of  the research agenda and the terms 
of  the broader scientific debate has also been identified through a range 
of  additional practices: employing individual researchers as consultants 
or inviting them to sit on company boards in order to signal objectivity 
and legitimacy; publicly critiquing established evidence and sowing 
doubt about its validity, often through the use of  front groups; and, using 
corporate social responsibility programmes as marketing campaigns 
(e.g. to shift the focus from obesogenic diets onto the importance of  active 
lifestyles by sponsoring sporting events) (Nestle 2015). These practices 
have been increasingly identified in relation to nutrition science with 
major implications for shaping evidence, narratives, and understanding.
4 Tipping the scale towards public health policy: Mexico’s tax on SSBs
Parts of  the food industry are very powerful, illustrated through the 
classic ‘hourglass’ depiction of  the food system with a pinch-point of  a 
few thousand transnational input suppliers, processors, and marketers 
between billions of  food producers and consumers (Hossain 2017). 
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Routinely, these groups fiercely oppose policy that they perceive to go 
against their economic interests. It therefore may be useful to consider 
cases in which policy favouring public health has been developed and 
implemented against those interests (area 1 of  our framework). What 
were the factors tipping the scale against these powerful interests, and 
hence what can we learn about the role of  public health evidence in the 
political economy of  the food–health nexus?
The case of  Mexico’s tax on SSBs illustrates how the balance of  political 
economy can shift in specific cases in relation to the role of  evidence, 
and how that evidence is framed. The 2013 adoption of  an excise 
tax on SSBs brought Mexico to the forefront of  public health policy 
development. It is also a case study in the successful leverage of  scientific 
evidence, civil society engagement, philanthropy, and public awareness-
raising efforts to overcome corporate opposition in a country where 
private companies (and the soda industry in particular) hold significant 
political influence (Rosenberg 2015), including through their support of  
educational and research institutions (Camp 2006).
The path towards governmental action began through an accumulation 
of  evidence concerning the role of  sugar consumption in the rise 
of  obesity in the past decades, moving the issue from area 5 in our 
framework (issues not yet identified) to area 4 (issue of  public health 
concern). Eight years prior to creating the tax, the Mexican National 
Institute of  Public Health (INSP) published the 2006 National Survey 
on Health and Nutrition (ENSANUT), which revealed that the 
prevalence of  obesity had drastically increased and become one of  
Mexico’s leading health burdens (Bonilla-Chacín et al. 2016). According 
to the survey results from 2012, 34.4 per cent of  school-age children, 
73 per cent of  adult women, and 69.4 per cent of  adult men in Mexico 
were either overweight or obese (Barquera, Campos and Rivera 2013). 
Furthermore, the INSP documented that caloric beverages represented 
over 20 per cent of  energy intake by Mexicans, and highlighted the 
stark increase (226 per cent increase among children and 252 per cent 
among adults) in the consumption of  caloric beverages between 1999 
and 2006 (ibid.). By 2013, Mexico had become the leading country 
worldwide in both consumption of  SSBs (with an estimated intake of  
163 litres per person per year) and in obesity rates (ibid.). The public 
health community used this evidence to frame SSBs as a key driver of  
obesity, and obesity as a major public health challenge in Mexico.
Confronted with this realisation, between 2007 and 2009, the 
Ministry of  Health began to stimulate knowledge generation on 
possible policy actions to reverse this trend, sparking dialogue among 
different government branches and other public health institutions, 
including the INSP (Bonilla-Chacín et al. 2016). An early focus was 
set on recommendations for healthy hydration (Barquera et al. 2013). 
This process of  awareness-raising and consensus-building around the 
need for government intervention culminated in the 2010 National 
Agreement for Nutritional Health (ANSA), which included a Strategy 
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against Overweight and Obesity with 117 proposed activities and 249 
actions (Bonilla-Chacín et al. 2016). However, few of  the proposals 
translated into concrete programmes; pressure by the food industry, 
insufficient government resources for implementation, and a general 
lack of  accountability have been blamed for relative lack of  action at 
that stage (Barquera et al. 2013). This represents a failure to effectively 
move from area 4 in our framework (issue of  public health concern) 
to area 2 (public health-focused policy). During these early attempts at 
policy, the issue had moved instead to area 3 (issues contested between 
public health and industry interests). An explicit dispute between public 
health concerns and food industry interests was at play, with each 
framing the evidence differently: the food industry maintaining that 
SSBs in moderation could be part of  a healthy diet; and the public 
health community insisting that SSBs were significantly contributing to 
the problem of  obesity.
At the same time, the obesity epidemic and a concurrent undernutrition 
problem had simultaneously started to attract considerable attention 
from a number of  civil society organisations whose core issues ranged 
from children’s rights to food sovereignty to water rights. Leading 
among those was the advocacy group El Poder del Consumidor 
(Consumer’s Power), which fought against industry pressure and 
supported pro-consumer policies (Rosenberg 2015). Rallying around 
the need for better nutrition, these organisations formed a loose 
coalition called the Alianza por la Salud Alimentaria (Alliance for 
Healthy Eating), which issued policy proposals, circulated educational 
information, delivered media campaigns, and lobbied public officials 
(Bonilla-Chacín et al. 2016).
In 2012, general elections loomed and the incoming party of  Peña 
Nieto had one focal policy: tax reform. Politically savvy Alianza leaders 
identified a unique window of  opportunity and swiftly agreed on one 
policy priority: introducing a tax on SSBs. In the months leading up to 
the election, they ran a sophisticated media campaign that focused on 
the health dangers of  SSBs. They also found allies within the incoming 
Senate, including Senator Marcela Torres Peimbert, who had previously 
worked in the public health sector. Only days after Peña Nieto took 
office, Torres Peimbert presented a comprehensive proposal drafted by 
academic and civil society organisations that called for a 20 per cent 
excise tax on SSBs. Though excluded from the 2013 budget proposal, 
and despite furious industry opposition, the idea of  an SSB tax received 
increased traction both in the National Development Plan and during 
civil society fora and events in 2013, and a one-peso-per-litre tax 
(representing a 10 per cent price increase) was finally included in the 
Law on the Special Tax on Production and Services (IEPS) in October 
2013, along with an 8 per cent ad valorem tax increase on high-calorie 
foods (Bonilla-Chacín et al. 2016), moving the issue to area 1 of  the 
framework (public health concerns positively addressed in policy, in 
explicit conflict with food industry interests).
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The availability of  robust international and local evidence of  links 
between SSB consumption and obesity, as well as evidence on the 
effects of  an SSB tax on consumption including updated nationally 
representative data through ENSANUT, were essential in the final 
success of  the tax proposal. Most importantly, the framing of  that 
evidence in terms of  the health benefits of  SSB taxes by public health 
advocates led to considerable public support (Rosenberg 2015). A 
strong intersectoral coalition of  medical, governmental, and scientific 
institutions dedicated to evidence-based policymaking (Barquera et al. 
2013), together with a powerful civil society umbrella organisation 
(Alianza por la Salud Alimentaria), provided the support for sophisticated 
media campaigns, professional lobbying efforts, and extensive public 
education, spreading that knowledge throughout society.
The battle in Mexico is now in area 1 of  our framework, with much of  
the food industry disputing and/or attempting to reframe the evidence 
once again. Four years after the Mexican legislation was introduced, 
more jurisdictions (Chile, France, Hungary, Portugal, South Africa, 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Thailand, Dominica, Barbados, Belgium, and some cities in the United 
States) are now or soon will be implementing some form of  tax on 
SSBs (Cornelsen and Smith 2018; Paarlberg, Mozaffarian and Micha 
2017). The evidence generated from these experiences so far indicates 
that the tax does reduce purchases (Redondo, Hernández-Aguado 
and Lumbreras 2018; Wright, Smith and Hellowell 2017), although 
the complexity of  diets and the interpretation of  epidemiological data 
make it difficult to establish how the reduction in SSB consumption 
is impacting health. As discussed in Section 3 of  this article, this 
uncertainty opens the door for contestation.
The sugar and SSB industry takes the fact that ‘causality cannot 
be established’ to define the tax as a ‘smoke and mirrors trick’ by 
governments (American Beverage Association 2016). The industry has 
mostly given up on contesting the evidence on the links between sugar 
consumption and obesity, moving its framing instead to questioning 
the effectiveness of  the tax policy or the intentions of  governments 
imposing the tax (which it portrays as a ‘tax grab’). It often argues that 
the tax is regressive since, in many countries, a larger proportion of  SSB 
consumers are at the lowest socioeconomic level, without acknowledging 
that some of  the highest declines in consumption have indeed been 
among this population (Haskins 2017; Dana and Nadler 2018).
In many ways, keeping the tax on SSBs as a legitimate tool for 
promotion of  public health (and in area 1 of  our framework) depends 
on further evidence and how that evidence is framed; not only on the 
impact of  a reduction in SSB consumption on health, but also on how 
the tax revenues generated through this policy can be used to achieve 
health results in a fair way. How this evidence is generated – and how it 
is framed on different sides of  the debate in different contexts – will be 
an important piece of  this policy process going forward.
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5 Conclusion: evidence-based policy in the food–health nexus
Knowledge is power; but framing matters. Both classical theories of  
the policy process and critical theories of  knowledge and ideas are 
important in understanding the role of  evidence in the food–health 
nexus. The existence of  credible indicators of  a problem (evidence) 
has been found to be a vital piece of  political commitment-building for 
issues such as nutrition and health in multiple countries (Pelletier et al. 
2011). But beyond this, the way an issue is framed, and even the types 
of  knowledge held to be valid in policy debates, also underpin policy 
processes (Leach, Sumner and Waldman 2008).
In the case of  sugar and its connection to obesity and NCDs, in the 
past five decades we have seen growing evidence making this an issue 
of  public health concern, with issue-framing narratives creating a sense 
of  urgency in the past decade as obesity reaches what are framed as 
crisis levels throughout the world. Food industry opposition has grown 
as proposed solutions (policies) have gone clearly against industry 
economic interests. And while evidence and advocacy alone are not 
sufficient, the strength of  evidence and its diffusion through advocacy, 
public education, and media campaigns have played an important 
role in counteracting the power of  corporations in some cases. This is 
how taxes on SSBs became a legitimate and supported policy in many 
jurisdictions, such as in Mexico. The way evidence and data are framed 
contributes to defining the urgency of  competing issues, and framing 
the policy options for what should be done in response (Harris 2019). 
It is the strength of  further evidence, and its diffusion through society, 
that can counteract new framings by the food industry as it attempts to 
discredit progressive food policy.
The 2017 report by IPES-Food draws our attention to how the 
prevailing power relations and narratives in food systems help to shape 
our understanding of  the impacts they generate. In other words, the 
report asks why evidence gaps persist, why impacts are systematically 
reproduced, and why certain problems are not politically prioritised. 
Power – to achieve visibility, to shape knowledge, to frame narratives, 
and to influence policy – is at the heart of  the food–health nexus, and 
shapes both which policy options are available and promoted, and 
what research is undertaken to uncover these issues. Moving forward, 
research on the nexus between food and health and the intersections 
between public policy and private interests should explicitly aim to 
understand the political economy behind policy debates, unpacking the 
language used and the implicit belief  systems and interests promoted. 
The framework we present above might help to structure this work. It is 
this type of  evidence that is lacking in current debates in many contexts, 
and it is this kind of  evidence that, given the right framing, can break 
deadlocks in food systems.
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Notes
*  Funding for this IDS Bulletin was provided by IPES-Food in 
furtherance of  their aim to apply a political economy approach in 
understanding and reforming food systems.
   This IDS Bulletin represents a collaboration between IDS and 
IPES-Food. Both organisations are committed to holistic, sustainable, 
democratic approaches to improving food systems, and to applying 
excellent research and political economy approaches in working 
towards these goals. We hope this IDS Bulletin represents the breadth 
of  debate at the 2018 workshop we co-sponsored, on ‘Political 
Economies of  Sustainable Food Systems: Critical Approaches, 
Agendas and Challenges’, and that it contributes to the sharing of  
knowledge in the name of  sustainable and equitable food systems.
1 Cecilia Rocha, Researcher, Centre for Studies in Food Security, 
Ryerson University, Canada; IPES-Food, Belgium.
2 Jody Harris, Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute of  Development Studies, 
Brighton, UK.
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